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Risk Comparisons in a Democratic Society:
What People Say They Do and Do Not Want
Branden B. Johnson*
Introduction
Informed citizens are central to a workable democratic society.
Ignorance among citizens about risk and its correlates, and the dangers
this poses for effective hazard management by society, are constant
themes in hazard management literature. Although the role of
knowledge in risk estimation or evaluation is disputed,1 a major
rationale for the research and practice of risk communication is to
enhance citizens' knowledge so that they can be responsible individual
hazard managers and voters.
One approach advocated for twenty years seeks wider use of
comparisons to "put into context" the risks of a given threat, context
most often defined by advocates to convey the message that what
people fear causes far fewer deaths than more familiar activities. Very
few studies have attempted explicit experimental tests of the effect of
risk comparisons, with mixed results. 2 These tests presented non-
random samples of the general public with alternate comparison
scenarios to experimentally test their effects on risk beliefs. In the spirit
of the common risk communication advice to assess one's audience, 3
* Dr. Johnson is a Research Scientist with the Bureau of Risk Analysis, Division of
Science, Research and Technology, NJ Dept. Environmental Protection. He has a
Ph.D. (Geography) and M.A. (Environmental Affairs) from Clark University and a
B.A. (Environmental Values and Behavior) from the University of Hawaii-Manoa.
This research was funded by NJDEP-DSRT through a contract with Rutgers
University. Views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the NJDEP.
Email: bjohnson@dep.state.nj.us.
1 See, e.g., Branden B. Johnson, Advancing Understanding of Knowledge's Role
in Lay Risk Perception, 4 Risk 189 (1993).
2 See Emilie Roth et. al., What Do We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?,
10 RiskAnal. 375 (1990); Paul Slovic et al., What Should We Know About Making
Risk Comparisons?, 10 Risk Anal. 389 (1990); William R. Freudenburg & Julie A.
Rursch, The Risks of 'Putting the Numbers in Context- A Cautionary Tale, 14 Risk
Anal. 949 (1994).
3 See, e.g., M. Granger Morgan & Lester Lave, Ethical Considerations in Risk
Communication Practice and Research, 10 RiskAnal. 355 (1990); Kerry K. Pflugh et
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I thought it useful to supplement such experiments by discussing the
topic directly with citizens, the research focus of this paper.
Background
Risk comparison criticisms vary widely. One approach has been to
argue that certain comparisons are more appropriate (less likely to be
publicly rejected) than others. For example, comparisons like this year's
emissions to last year's, or to a public health standard, have been
deemed better than comparisons of highly dissimilar items, e.g.,
voluntary versus involuntary risks. 4 A tougher criterion is that
"comparisons of risk-related situations or alternatives" are only useful if
alternatives can actually replace one another, as in a decision to purchase
(or have produced) one chemical over another. By contrast, one cannot
choose to substitute the risk of being hit by a meteorite for the risk of
breathing a chemical. 5 The most challenging criticism is that
comparison advocates focus on a single element (communication
context and trust, content or format of comparison, communication
aim), when all of these elements must be dealt with for the comparison
to be "compelling... in changing somebody's... perspective on the
risk/decision." Thus, an effective comparison requires more than "a
discrete [isolated] communication" of one or few numbers put in a
certain way for a given goal, for particular decision alternatives.
Understanding, and promoting dialogue on, the varied choices for each
of these elements might be needed for comparisons to be
worthwhile. 6
The scant experimental evidence on these hypotheses is mixed, and
not very apposite. One experiment7 tested 14 types of comparisons
usable in a hypothetical factory manager's planned speech about the
al., Establishing Dialogue: Planning for Successful Environmental Management; A
Guide to Effective Communication Planning, N.J. Department of Environmental
Protection and Energy, Division of Science and Research (1992).
4 See Vincent T. Covello, Peter M. Sandman, & Paul Slovic, Risk
Communication, Risk Statistics, and Risk Comparisons: A Manual for Plant
Managers, Washington, D.C.: Chemical Manufacturers Association (1988).
5 See Sven Ove Hansson, Incomparable Risks in Proceedings: New Risk
Frontiers, Stockholm, Sweden: Center for Risk Research (Britt-Marie Drottz-Sjbberg,
ed. 1997).
6 Personal interview with John Kadvany (1997).
7 See Roth et al., supra note 2.
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risks of emissions from his factory. The citizen preferences among
comparisons expected by professional communicators were not the
same as those of the upper-middle class respondents, although
researchers and critics wondered whether these preferences would have
appeared if the scenario used involved a local, controversial situation.
Other experiments8 focused on such topics as how easily the impact
of a comparison (e.g., to reduce risk estimates and concern) might be
reversed.
Given limited empirical evidence for the value of risk comparisons
for democratic deliberation of hazard management, I felt it important
to explore with citizens how they might feel about risk comparisons.
The preliminary data presented here stems from two focus groups that
consists of the beginning of a larger project on the topic, and are
intended for illustrative purposes only.
Research Design
Organizations were invited to receive $20 for each volunteer
recruited for focus groups; two focus groups were conducted with
church members in central New Jersey. They comprised of 15 women
and seven men, in their mid-30s to early 70s, in such work as speech
pathologist, minister, mechanic, housewife (4), teacher (chemistry [2],
voice/music [2], 4H), insurance teacher, dietician, software engineer,
and librarian. It also included retirees from the food industry,
automobile sales, nursing, and school secretary. Two were actively
involved with the local recycling program, one with wildlife
rehabilitation, and four were members of national environmental
groups. I used standard procedures to facilitate the discussions.
The focus group protocol began with warm-up questions on interest
in environmental information and felt need for "context." Then
members read a quotation from proposed legislation (S. 981 in the last
Congress) on risk assessment, that "each agency shall... place the nature
and magnitude of a risk to health, safety, or the environment.., in
relationship to other reasonably comparable risks familiar to and
routinely encountered by the general public' as part of making decisions
about whether and how to regulate that risk." They were asked to
8 See Slovic et al., supra note 2; see also Freudenburg et al., supra note 2.
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comment on this proposed policy, including what "routine," "familiar,"
and "reasonably comparable" meant to them. Then a series of more
focused examples was offered: a jury considering a hypothetical
asbestos case; 9 radon; 10 drinking water; 1 1 industrial emissions; 12
and an economic development commission asking voters to consider
alternate land uses that might bring the town about $2 million in gross
revenue a year (60-home subdivision; shopping mall; high-technology
factory; chemical or low-level radioactive waste disposal facility).13
Each example has been the topic of risk comparison research, or
suggested or used by government agencies, but the aim in these case
discussions was not to present actual or hypothetical risk comparisons,
as in experiments discussed earlier. Rather, the aim was to ask whether
and what comparisons would be useful to participants in these situations
(including what, if anything, counted as "familiar," ".routine," etc.). If
needed, they would be asked to read a list of things to which the case
might be compared, but without any quantitative or qualitative
comparisons. Questions on trust in, sources of, and disputes over risk
comparisons concluded the protocol. 14
In practice, I followed the protocol loosely due to its length, and it
became clear that the generic questions about risk comparisons were, by
and large, far too abstract for these audiences. Initially, they found it
difficult to grasp the meaning of comparisons in the environmental
context; the case studies eased, but it did not eliminate this confusion
for everyone.
9 As in the scenario used by Slovic et al., supra note 2.
10 A comparison, involving cancers presumably caused by natural radon in indoor air
and cancers presumably caused by other environmental problems (e.g., air pollution;
hazardous waste sites) in New Jersey, used by the Bureau of Environmental Radiation,
NJDEP in some public risk messages.
11 In 1999 all water utilities in the U.S. will be required to anually report to their
customers the quality of their drinking water, the subject of this comparison
discussion.
12 As in the scenario used by Roth et al., supra note 3.
13 A comparison suggested by Dr. Jill Lipoti (personal communication) but not used
for a LLRW siting case.
14 Generic trust in any potential source of risk comparisons was lacking -"some of
it simply feels like scare tactics" and "they seem to pick ... something that makes
them sound good..."- although low-resource "altruistic" sources were deemed a bit
more trustworthy. A comment that a government comparison involving natural radon
was "good" might have implied some trust in a specific instance despite that person's
denia[ of trust generically.
Johnson: Risk Comparisons in a Democratic Society 225
Results
Dissimilar Comparisons. It has been said that people will reject
comparisons of items they deem improperly dissimilar, such as risks of
driving to a public meeting versus risks of hypothetical future emissions
of the as-yet-unbuilt facility whose permit is the meeting's topic. 15
Although focus group members struggled with the generic concept of
comparisons, over half in each group had enough familiarity with it to
spontaneously volunteer "bad" comparisons they heard, such as of
exposure to a hazard through food ingestion versus death in a car
accident, or radon versus automobile risks, or of industrial emissions
versus larger exposure to the same carcinogen if pumping gas at a gas
station all day ("that didn't make me feel very much better, because I
wouldn't want to breathe all the gasoline fumes all day either!").
Comparing voluntary to involuntary risks, a topic raised in both
groups without prompting by the facilitator, was rejected vocally and
strongly by most members as inappropriate; yet, this rule was not
applied consistently. For example, when discussing the asbestos case,
one group rejected a comparison to voluntary tobacco smoking; yet, in
discussing the federal bill, one person cited tobacco smoking as a good
comparison:
... when radon was big they compared it to cigarette
smoking, and I thought that was probably a good
comparison because radon does have lung effects, too.... To
me that would be a helpful situation.
Individual participants offered preferred comparisons, with at least
half of other members of respective groups vocally or non-verbally
agreeing: comparison of the risks of camping versus playing golf in a
lightning storm (preferable to, say, comparing risks of being hit by
lightning to those of winning a lottery); comparing the risks of one
food (or contaminant or component) to those of another; comparing
one energy generation option to another; and comparing utility water
quality to bottled water quality. As one person said, "It's got to be
'apples to apples,' closely controlled." This contrasts with an argument
(not cited in the focus groups) that "we all routinely compare highly
15 See Morgan & Lave, supra note 3. See also Hansson, supra note 5; see
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management,
Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making, Final
Report, Vol. 2, at 43 (Washington, D.C.: Gov't Printing Office, 1997).
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dissimilar states," including health risks or apples-and-oranges, by
disaggregating their attributes, rating how they vary across choices and
their value, and summing up for a composite evaluation of choices. 16
Acceptance of Comparisons for Personal Decisions. Risk experts
have mostly debated risk comparisons' effects on lay decisions about
what government agencies and for-profit firms should do about a given
hazard. Citizens' duties as individual hazard managers have received
little attention in the discussion of environmental 17 risk comparisons,
although much research has tested messages relevant to personal
behavior that reduces risk (e.g., on natural radon).
Focus group members offered spontaneous comments that suggest
this has been an oversight. Take, for example, the opinion of a woman
who rejected information in her public-citizen role as a juror that
seemed valuable for her private-citizen role as a parent:
I don't agree completely that that data about the
hazards of smoking versus asbestos is irrelevant from a legal
point of view. For me it would be irrelevant as a juror,
ecause I agree, you know, the students choose to smoke,
they don't choose to be in an environment that includes
asbestos.... Now, as a human being, I think that it's relevant
information to have, and helpful information to have,
because it helps you to know what to do with an asbestos
scare, how to weigh that inside of yourself, how to weigh
that if you're a parent, how concerned you're going to be
about your children. So as a juror it would be irrelevant, but
I don't think it's completely irrelevant, as a citizen I think
it's relevant.
The majority of members in one focus group felt that comparing the
number of cancers estimated to be caused in New Jersey by natural
radon to other potential environmental causes of cancer (hazardous
waste, air pollution, etc.) was valuable. Asked why they reacted in this
way, while rejecting similar comparisons with regard to the asbestos
jury case, one participant said:
You can do something about it yourself, rather than
having another agency do it or a litigation, you can get the
test and then take care of it yourselves. So it's easier to do.
16 See Adam M. Finkel, Toward Less Misleading Comparisons of Uncertain
Risks: The Example ofAflatoxin andAlar, 103 Env'l Health Perspectives 376 (1995).
17 Medical risk communication has long used comparisons (e.g., for patients).
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Discussing the legislative proposal, a participant in the other focus
group said: 18
If the initial risk that you're trying to draw these
comparisons to is something that I have no control over,
comparisons would be interesting, but I would want
someone else to fix the problem, regardless. If you're going
to compare air pollution to cigarette smoking, interesting,
but I have no choice over what I breathe; I do have a choice
over whether or not I smoke.
In both meetings, participants cited examples of valuable comparisons:
widely-agreed examples included the impacts of various lawn and
garden fertilizers and pesticides, and alternate uses of residential
properties (e.g., natural yards), and the impacts of recycling various
materials.
Hazard Management Priorities. Despite the widespread reaction
against comparisons involving issues with seemingly no chance for
personal decision or control, a couple of people hinted that more
general comparisons among environmental issues might be welcome:
If nothing else, that would help establish an order of
priorities... If the risks associatet with water pollution
exceed the risks associated with air pollution by a factor of
10, obviously the first thing we would want to address is
water, not whether you're going to be struck by lightning...
that's an irrelevant statistic.... And we have toxic waste
dumps, the problem is what do you do with the stuff. That
should be where the money should be, where the attention
should be, and you do have to compare against other...
reasonably comparable risks. Two things give you cancer.
One's going to give it to a lot of people real quick, and one
is a real maybe, you want to give up on the maybe and focus
on the - (Another partcpant asked, "So you want to work
on the triage theory?") Yea.
Reaction to Proposed Legislation. As noted earlier, proposed
federal legislation would in part require comparison of the risk being
considered for regulation to "reasonably comparable" risks "familiar to
and routinely encountered by the general public." As a potential
audience for such comparisons, the third of participants who expressed
an opinion were largely dubious about their value, citing distrust of the
18 A couple of people in each focus group said that having no one to blame for
radon, as compared to the asbestos jury case, made it easier to accept and use risk
comparison information, but they could not explain why they felt this way.
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comparison sources, and a preference for comparisons concerning
personal, rather than societal, decisions about risky entities and
activities. One person said that "the phrase 'reasonably comparable
risks' is going to generate a lot of lawsuits."
Conclusions
Evaluating any means for democratic participation, much less how
to convey hazard information to inform democratic participants,
should involve multiple methods and measures. The tentative results
reported here from two focus groups require verification. Although I
have no reason to believe that members of these church-based groups
from two separate communities were atypical in their reactions to the
concept of risk comparisons, as with any focus groups that cannot be
confirmed by the focus group process itself. I plan follow-up research to
confirm or refute these reactions in a larger population, including
experiments to see whether the comparative information desired by
these focus group members affects their hypothetical decisions and
behavioral intentions. However, these obviously tentative focus group
results are no more tentative than the sketchy and potentially
conflicting results of the few experimental studies done to date (since
they include no replications, we cannot say whether their findings
conflict). Talking directly to intended citizen audiences about their
beliefs and wants produced findings in this case that were neither
predicted nor produced by experiments to date; that is both a potential
benefit and a reason to seek confirmation.
It has been noted often 19 that much risk communication stresses
the aims of the intended communicator, not those of the intended
recipient of a message. Most advocates of environmental risk
comparisons hope to convince citizens that existing or proposed
activities by business or government are acceptable (or, more rarely,
unacceptable). This aim was of little interest to the middle-class citizens
involved in this study. They appeared to believe that risk comparison
information is either unnecessary20 (because these institutions should
19 See, e.g., Covello, Sandman & Slovic, supra note 4.
20 At least they say it is unnecessary for them. Whether they truly believe
institutional decision-makers do not need this information is less clear, despite cited
normative beliefs, since focus group participants were not asked about this explicitly.
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act or avoid action on "obvious" moral or other bases, not deliberate
upon risk information or try to persuade citizens about the acceptability
of risks) or suspect as persuasive propaganda. These findings are neither
entirely surprising nor reason to abandon this kind of persuasive
communication. 2 1 But they clarify obstacles that institutional
communicators must address for successfully informing and motivating
citizens participation in policy formulation or implementation. For
example, communicators might need to know more about the "mental
models" of hazard management systems that citizens have, 2 2 and
clarify why action without deliberating upon risk information would be
worse than swift, but incompletely informed, action.
The self-concept of citizens as hazard managers also deserves more
attention from risk communicators. 23 We know little about how much
citizens see themselves as people able to make choices that affect
environmental quality. (They do seem to make at least some erroneous
attributions of cause and responsibility; e.g., in one national survey
2 4
nearly half of the respondents believed factories were the primary cause
of U.S. water pollution, with only 23% identifying runoff as the largest
cause.) Citizenship requires more than merely voting in elections or
speaking at a public meeting on what one wants others to do; it calls for
doing one's part to protect the public weal. Communications with
comparisons that motivate and direct personal action on environmental
quality without preaching, and research testing responses to such
messages, would seem to be a valuable complement to institution-
focused comparisons that these citizens would appreciate.
21 On ethical issues of persuasion, see Morgan & Lave, supra note 3; Katherine E.
Rowan, The Technical and Democratic Approaches to Risk Situations: Their Appeal,
Limitations, and Rhetorical Alternative, 8 Argumentation 391 (1994); Branden B.
Johnson, Ethical Issues in Risk Communication: Continuing the Discussion, Risk
Anal. (forthcoming 1999).
22 See Branden B. Johnson, Trust Judgments in Complex Hazard Management
Systems: The Potential Role of Concepts of "The System" Advances in Social Trust
Theory and Research (George Cvetkovich & Ragnar L~fstedt eds. forthcoming
1999).
23 For a rare study of this topic, see Robert E. O'Connor, Richard J. Bord, & Ann
Fisher, Rating Threat Mitigators: Faith in Experts, Governments, and Individuals
Themselves to Create a Safer World, 18 Risk Anal. 547 (1998).
24 National Environmental Education and Training Foundation, The National
Report Card on Environmental Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviors; The Sixth
Annual Survey of Adult Americans. (Washington, D.C., Roper Starch Worldwide
November 1997).
10 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 221 [Summer 1999]
Finally, citizens' judgments of risk comparisons appear to be
complex, within as well as between participants. Examples include
asbestos comparisons accepted in a parental role but not a juror role;
tobacco-smoking comparisons rejected in the asbestos jury case (with an
accused defendant) but accepted in the natural radon case with "no one
to blame;" and distrust of comparison sources in general but trust in
government's radon cancer comparisons. These exemplify the argument
cited earlier 25 that communication context and trust, and the content
and format of comparisons, can affect how citizens react to risk
comparisons. Beyond testing every intended message, as long urged, 2 6
communication practitioners and researchers must consider context,
trust, content and format in tests of risk comparison messages. Risk
communication will have its best chance to support the inherent
complexity of informed (by risk comparisons) democratic decision-
making if communicators and citizens work together to produce
comparisons that are accurate, informative, and used.
25 Supra note 7.
2 Supra note 4.
